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The dramatic improvement in macroeconomic outcomes during the 1990s - stable, low inflation and
high, stable growth - can be at least partly ascribed to improved monetary policy. Central banks
became more independent and many of them adopted inflation targeting. This paper examines the
potential for further improvements by refining the concept of inflation targeting. We construct a
general model that encompasses a broad array of possible target regimes, and apply it to the data.
Our results suggest that the vast majority of countries could benefit from moving to pricepath
targeting, where the central bank makes up for periods of above (below) target inflation with later
periods of below (above) target inflation.
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The 1990s were amazing in many ways. Not only did the internet and cellular
phones come into widespread use, but overall economic conditions improved nearly
everywhere we look. Growth was higher, inﬂation was lower, and both were more
stable. In the U.S., for example, inﬂation fell from 6 percent at the beginning of the
decade to less than 2 percent by the end. Meanwhile real growth rose from less than 3
percent to over 4 percent. And volatility declined, too. The American case is the most
dramatic of what has really been a world-wide trend.1 And while these improvements
in economic performance could have been the consequence of the world being calmer,
Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause (2002) argue that roughly three-quarters of it
can be explained by better monetary policy. That is, central bankers did a better job
of stabilizing inﬂation at low levels while keeping growth high.
Making better monetary policy is not just a problem of ﬁnding compentent central
bankers. In fact, there is a history of central bankers who tried to do their jobs, but
were thwarted by politicians. Over the years we have learned that the institutional
environment is at least as important as the people in insuring good policy outcomes.
Without a well-designed central bank, the people in charge don’t have a chance. To-
day, we have a good sense of what best practice is in the design of central banks.
First, it is crucial that monetary policymakers are independent of short-term politi-
cal inﬂuences. Second, these independent central bankers must be held accountable
through mechanisms that involve public announcement of objectives. Inﬂation tar-
geting is the most common formulation of the sort of policy regime in place today.2
The primary element of inﬂation targeting is a public commitment to price stability
in the form of a medium-term numerical inﬂation target.
1Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2002) compare the 1985 to 1989 period with 1993 to 1997 for a set of
23 industrialized and emerging market countries and ﬁnd that annual inﬂation fell by an average of
ﬁve percentage points, annual growth rose by an average of one percentage point, and both were
signiﬁcantly more stable.
2For a brief synopsis of what inﬂation targeting entails see Mishkin (forthcoming).
1With the success of inﬂation targeting has come a discussion of potential reﬁne-
ments. One issue is whether the central bank should adopt a target for inﬂation or a
target for the path of the price level. With an inﬂation target, the central bank sim-
ply tries to insure that period-by-period inﬂation remains close to the target. When
inﬂation turns out to be above or below the target, the miss is forgotten. Bygones are
bygones, so there is a form of base drift in the (log) price level. Price-path targeting,
or “price-level targeting” as it is often called, is diﬀerent as it implies that when the
the price level is above or below the target path, the objective of policy is to return
it to the preset target path.3 This means that if prices move above the target path,
then policy will need to bring them back down.4 But which one is better? Should
central banks be instructed to target inﬂation or target the price path?
Svensson (1999) is the ﬁrst person to take on this question. He starts by assuming
that society actually cares about inﬂation. The social objective is to minimize the
expected present discounted value of the weighted average of squared deviations of
inﬂation and output from their targets. He then posits that the central bank can
be bound to meet a particular objective, but not to respond to shocks in a speciﬁc
way. That is, the central bank will always have discretion in adjusting its instrument,
but it can be held accountable for its objective. This sort of discretion, what we
might refer to as “instrument discretion,” implies that if we were to instruct central
bankers to minimize the true social loss function, there would be a bias. The exact
form of the bias depends on the structure of the economy, but in most cases there
is a bias toward stabilizing output.5 One solution to this problem is to instruct the
central bank to minimize a loss function that deviates from society’s. Rogoﬀ (1985)
suggested appointing central bankers that are more avid inﬂation hawks than the
3We adopt the terminology price-path targeting rather than the traditional price-level targeting
to emphasize that the target path can have a positive slope and so a period of inﬂation need not be
countered with one of deﬂation.
4Mervyn King (1999) argues that in practice there is little diﬀerence between inﬂation targeting
and price-path targeting. The reason is that politicians will hold central bankers accountable for
meeting inﬂation targets over suﬃciently long horizons, that it will look like a price-path target. We
will take this up in more detail below.
5For a discussion see Clark, Goodhart and Huang (1999).
2public at large.
In this context, Svensson shows that in countries where output is suﬃciently per-
sistent, performance can be improved by instructing policymakers to target the price
path, even though society cares about inﬂation.6 To understand why output persis-
tence is central to the result, note that the more persistent output is, the longer output
stays away from equilibrium following a disturbance. Now consider the possibility of
a policy response. Monetary policy responds to shocks by inducing a price-level
surprise, immediately creating a conﬂict between the output and inﬂation stability
objectives. And the more persistent output is, the longer lasting the shocks and the
more important it will be to aggressively respond to them. If the goal is to stabilize
prices, then these agressive responses will have to be undone quickly, which ends up
lowering the volatility of inﬂation.
There are several issues that arise in considering this result. First, Svensson
compares inﬂation targeting with price-path targeting in order to emphasize the con-
trast between in two. But there are really a continuum of intermediate possibilities
that weight the two. Batini and Yates (2001) have labeled these “hybrid-targeting”
regimes. We begin by showing that for a given degree of output persistence, there is
an optimal hybrid-targeting policy that is a weighted average of inﬂation and price-
path targeting. But second, and more importantly, the focus on output persistence
means that the choice is an empircial one. What is the optimal regime for a given
country? And beyond this, there is the question of whether it is worth trying to move
to the optimal regime. Clarity is and should be highly prized in central banking.
In fact, an optimal hybrid target sacriﬁces simplicity for optimality. It is much
diﬃcult to explain a hybrid than it would be to explain either of the extreme alter-
natives. However, as King (1999) has suggested, one of the key policy choices is the
horizon over which central bankers are evaluated. That is, are they asked to maintain
6More recent papers by Dittmar and Gavin (2000), and Vestin (2000) conﬁrm this result.
3inﬂation at or near the target level on average every two, three, ﬁve or even ten years?
Put another way, central bankers will have an horizon over which they are expected
to bring the price level back to its desired path. Under this interpretation, hybrid-
targeting becomes a statement about the optimal horizon over which the price level
is brought back to the desired path, it may not that hard to convince people that
they should give the central bank some time to ﬁght back unwanted price shocks.
Even so, the idea that central bankers should, for strategic reasons, be told to do
something that explicitly deviates from what society truly cares about will trouble
many people. Should we go to the trouble of explaining that we are instructing the
central bank to do one thing, while we care about another because we know that they
can’t be trusted? Again, this is an empirical question. How much do we lose by just
telling monetary policymakers to target the thing that society cares about?
To address these issues, we examine a set of 23 countries and ﬁnd that for nearly all
of them some form of hybrid-targeting regime would be optimal – at least in principle.
But we go on to show that adopting such an optimal regime has only very modest
beneﬁts (as measured by the percentage reduction in the social loss) when compared
with strict inﬂation targeting. In other words, once you look at the numbers closely it
is hard to see the beneﬁt of starting to engage in what would surely be a very diﬃcult
public dialogue. Our conclusion is that we should hold central bankers accountable
for meeting our social loss function, not some contrived one that might incrementally
improve macroeconomic performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we set out the theo-
retical problem and derive the optimal hybrid-targeting regime. And we show that
this can be interpreted as the optimal horizon. We also show the relationship be-
tween output persistence and the weight on price stability. And we presents a set of
empirical results, compare the loss between optimal targeting regime and inﬂation or
price-paths targeting, and the ﬁnal section concludes.
42 Hybrid Targeting
The theoretical exercise is straightforward. Society cares about a weighted average
of inﬂation and output deviations from their target paths. If it were possible to bind
policymakers to react to shocks in a particular way, then it would be optimal to give
them society’s objective and then hold them accountable for adjusting their policy
instrument in the way prescribed by the reaction function that minimizes this social
objective. But such commitment is impossible (and may not even be desirable).
Instead, the central bank can be held accountable for minimizing a loss function
under discretion. What should that loss function be?
To answer this question, we proceed in two steps. First, we derive the central
bank’s policy reaction function, or instrument rule, under discretion for a family of
loss functions that admits a wide variety of targeting regimes. Second, given the
solution we ﬁnd the targeting regime that minimizes the social loss. This is the
optimal hybrid.
2.1 The Central Banker’s Problem
The policymaker solves a standard optimal control problem, choosing the path
of the price level that minimizes a quadratic loss function subject to the constraints














where pt is the (log)actual price level, p¤ is the desired price level, yt is the (log)actual
output, y¤ is desired(or potential) output level, ¸ is the degree to which the central
5bank prefers price stability to output stability, and ¯ is the time discount factor.
Equation (1) is suﬃciently general to admit inﬂation targeting, price-path targeting,
and everything in between. Targeting regimes diﬀer depending on how the target, p¤
t,
is deﬁned. The simplest cases are inﬂation targeting, where
p
¤
t(IT) = pt¡1 + ¼
¤ (2)







In both cases the “inﬂation target” is ¼¤. But under inﬂation targeting, given by
(2), the target is an increment over the past period’s realized price level, whatever it
turned out to be. By contrast, under price-path targeting, the current target is an
increment over the past period’s target.
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where ´ is the weight on inﬂation targeting. Notice that ´ = 1 and ´ = 0 are the
special cases of inﬂation and price- path targeting. Substituting (4) into the loss
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Normalization implies that y is now the output gap, and that the price path is now
measured as the deviation from the inﬂation objective ¼¤.
6Following Svensson (1999) and others, we assume that the dynamics of the econ-
omy are adequately described by a Neo-Classical Phillips Curve.7 That is,
yt = ½yt¡1 + ®(pt ¡ p
e
t) + ²t; (6)
where pe
t is the expectation of p at time t, ½ and ® are constants and ² is an i.i.d. shock
with variance ¾2
². For the points that we wish to make here, this closed economy model
is suﬃcient. In the empirical section, we expand the analysis to an open-economy
version that includes import prices as well.
The job of the central bank is to choose a path for the price level pt that minimizes
the loss (5) subject to (6).8 Assuming rational expectations, we can use the techniques
described in Svensson(1997, 1999) to ﬁrst derive the ﬁrst order conditions, guess the
solution and then use the method of undetermined coeﬃcients.9 The ﬁrst order
conditions include the output equation (6) and
pt ¡ ´pt¡1 = ¡
®(1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ a½¯)
¸[1 ¡ ½¯(½ ¡ b®)](1 ¡ ´½¯)
yt: (7)
Equation (7) embodies the trade-oﬀ between output and prices in the loss function.
It tells us the extent to which prices react to output shocks along an optimal path.
Under rational expectations, we know that the solution for the price level must be of
the form
pt = apt¡1 + byt¡1 + c²t: (8)
7We choose the Neo-Classical Phillips Curve because of its theoretical tractability. There are
a number of alternatives, including the now common New-Keynesian Phillips Curve in which the
output gap depends on expected-future prices rather than current ones, and the aggregate supply
formulation dervided by Mankiw and Reis (2001) in their work on sticky information. While it
would be feasible to examine these alternatives numerically, the more conventional Phillips Curve
allows us to derive a wider range of conclusions.
8By adding an aggregate demand curve relating the price level to the interest rate, we could
shift the problem to one in which the central bank does not choose prices directly. This increase in
complexity changes none of our results.
9See also S¨ oderlind(1999).
7We can solve this for
a = ´
b =
¡(1 ¡ ½2¯) +
q









¸[1 ¡ ½¯(½ ¡ b®)]
:
Setting ´ equal to either zero or one, this solution collapses to the one in Svensson
(1999).
This formulation allows us to write the laws of motion for output and prices, and
these are
yt = ½yt¡1 + (1 + ®c)²t (9)
pt = ´pt¡1 + byt¡1 + c²t : (10)
That is, output depends on lagged output, while prices depend on both lagged prices
and lagged output.
As others have noted, for a solution to the central bankers problem to exist, the
coeﬃcient on lagged output in the price equation, b, must have a real value. That is,







As Parkin (2000) points out, this condition is somewhat restrictive, since only large
values of ¸ are consistent with high persistence in output (½ close to one). This
means that if ¸ is low and ½ is high, there is no solution. The reason is that, under
these circumstances the optimal response to stabilize output requires very high, even
8inﬁnite volatility of price level (or inﬂation).10 Fortunately, most estimates that we
know of suggest that central banks place much higher weight on inﬂation than they
do on output volatility. For example, Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) estimate ¸’s for
a number of countries, and most of them are 3
4 or higher. So we view this problem as
unlikely to occur in practice.
2.2 Society’s Problem
With a complete characterization of the central bank’s problem in hand, we can
now turn to society’s problem: What value of ´ should monetary policymakers be
instructed to use? To ﬁgure this out, all we need to do is ﬁnd the value of ´ that
minimizes the social loss function, taking account of the central banker’s behavior.
Recall that we assume society minimizes a weighted average of inﬂation and output
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For now we look only at the case in which ¸ is the same for society and the central
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Taking the derivative with respect to ´ (noting that D is not a function of ´ and






10As we show in the appendix, this is a problem that only arises under discretion. If the central
bank can be forced to commit to an instrument rule, then the problem always has a solution.
9The result tells us that as ½ approaches 1, so that the shocks to output are extremely
persistent, ´¤ goes to zero. As ½ shrinks, ´¤ grows, but we assume that it can never
exceed one. Importantly, the expression is consistent with Svensson’s result. He
shows that if one is restricted to choosing ´ = 0 or ´ = 1, then the threshold is at
½ = 0:5.
Before proceeding, we note that under commitment, where society can bind poli-
cymakers not just to an objective function but to an instrument rule as well, the best
thing to do is to give the central bank society’s loss function. That’s not at all sur-
prising. What is surprising is that if society’s loss is in terms of the price path rather
than inﬂation, that is LS is a function of ¾2
p rather than ¾2
¼, then the discretionary
solution is the same as the commitment solution.11
2.3 Stabilization Bias
So far, we have been concerned with the beneﬁts to be obtained from giving the
central bank a hybrid target. But in addition to choosing ´¤, society has the option
of giving the central bank a ¸ that deviates from its own. The incentive for doing
this comes from the fact that, left to their own devices, central bankers may choose
to stabilize output more than is socially optimal. Avoiding this stabilization bias
requires setting ¸CB above ¸S.
To see how this works, we return to equation (13) and note ﬁrst that the ¸’s
here represent social preferences and that the D (deﬁned in the previous section) is
a function of the central bank’s ¸. Using this, we can rewrite the expression for the
11If inﬂation’s primary cost is that it makes long-term planning diﬃcult, then this may be the
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This change has no impact on the degree of optimal hybrid targeting. ´¤ was not a
function of ¸ before, and it isn’t now. But minimizing (15) requires not only ﬁnding
´¤, but also ﬁguring out what ¸CB should be as well. The ﬁrst-order condition for





where f(¢) is an increasing function of ½. So with given ¸s, as ½ rises, ¸CB rises as
well.
Figure (1) plots the relationship between output persistence and ¸CB when ¸s is
0.5 and 0.8. Throughout we assume that ´ is set at the optimal level, ´¤ in equation
(14). The result is clear: the more persistent output is, the more conservative the
central banker should be. And as the output approaches a random walk, the closer
¸CB gets to one.
This is a good place to make another important point. In the last section we noted
that there are times when the discretionary solution to the central banker’s problem
does not exist. Looking back at the restriction (11) required for existence, we see
that there is always a solution when ¸ is big enough. So, if we are concerned that ½
may be high, we can avoid potential diﬃculties by instructing the central banker to
care almost exclusively about inﬂation.
11Figure 1: Central Bank’s ¸
123 Empirical Results
We now see that the optimal hybrid-targeting regime – the degree to which the
central bank should target inﬂation relative to targeting the path of the price level –
depends on how persistent output is. This leads us to ask how persistent is output
and how close is the actual behavior of prices to what it would be under an optimal
targeting regime? The task of this section is to bring data to bear on these questions.
We do this in three steps. First, we estimate an empirical analog of the closed-
economy model we studied in Section 2. Second, since a number of countries we
consider are small open economies, we introduce external factors into the estimation.
Finally, we posit a social loss function in order to do welfare comparisons and measure
the gains from adopting an optimal hybrid target.
3.1 Closed Economy
Our strategy is the following. Using quarterly data on consumer prices and indus-
trial production, we estimate equations (9) and (10).12 (The data are all described
in the Appendix.) Taking account of the serial correlation in output, we use the
following speciﬁcations:
yt = ½yt¡1 +
4 X
i=1
°i∆yt¡i + e1t (16)
pt = ´pt¡1 + b1yt¡1 + b2yt¡2 + b3yt¡3 + b4yt¡4 + e2t; (17)
where y is computed as the deviation of log output from Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered
output, and p measures the deviation of the log price level from a measure of the
12We note that our exact results are not invariant to the choice of the frequency of the data.
13target. During the periods when countries were employing inﬂation targets, we used
the target itself for this computation.13 In the absence of an inﬂation target, we used
a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.
The results for both the full sample (1980s and 1990s), and just the last decade
are reported in Table 1 and Table 2. Estimates range widely.14 The ﬁrst table shows
estimates of ½, together with standard errors. The important thing to notice is that ½
ranges from a low of 0.29 to a high of 0.82, and that it is unstable across time periods.
Both the range and instability have important implications for policy, and so we will
return to them later.15
Table 2 reports our estimates of the optimal hybrid-targeting regime, this is ˆ ´¤, as
well as the estimate that is implied by the actual behavior of prices in each country,
this is ˜ ´. Our estimates of ½ suggest that a number of countries should be putting
signiﬁcant weight on the price path, ˆ ´¤ << 1, but virtually all of them exhibit
behavior that is closer to inﬂation targeting, ˜ ´ ¼ 1. Given these estimates, we test
whether ˜ ´ = ´¤ and the answer is no. The p-value is reported in the 3rd and 6th
column of Table 2.16
13For the cases in which we have data for an explicit inﬂation target, we compute the price-path
target as p¤
t = log(CPIt¡1) + ¼¤, where ¼¤ is the annual inﬂation target. Details are in the data
appendix.
14All estimates throughout the paper are median-bias corrected using the empirical distributions
that are also used to compute the standard errors.
15While we report results for an HP ﬁlter with parameter set to the standard 1600, experimentation
in the range from 800 to 3200 leave the character of our results unchanged.
16Using a nonparametric bootstrap, we compute the empirical distribution of ˆ ´¤ and then report
the p-value for ˜ ´ in that distribution.
14Table 1: Output Persistence: The Closed Economy Case
Full Sample 1990s
Country ˆ ½ s.e. ˆ ½ s.e.
Australia 0.64 ( 0.10 ) 0.49 ( 0.18 )
Austria 0.76 ( 0.19 ) 0.66 ( 0.36 )
Canada 0.73 ( 0.06 ) 0.74 ( 0.09 )
Chile 0.57 ( 0.21 ) 0.47 ( 0.43 )
Denmark 0.56 ( 0.14 ) 0.31 ( 0.23 )
Finland 0.78 ( 0.07 ) 0.65 ( 0.13 )
France 0.61 ( 0.15 ) 0.61 ( 0.15 )
Germany 0.70 ( 0.10 ) 0.61 ( 0.17 )
Ireland 0.56 ( 0.12 ) 0.50 ( 0.19 )
Israel 0.56 ( 0.09 ) 0.29 ( 0.15 )
Italy 0.71 ( 0.10 ) 0.63 ( 0.15 )
Japan 0.78 ( 0.05 ) 0.69 ( 0.09 )
Korea 0.58 ( 0.10 ) 0.60 ( 0.13 )
Mexico 0.64 ( 0.10 ) 0.69 ( 0.15 )
Netherlands 0.64 ( 0.15 ) 0.68 ( 0.23 )
New Zealand 0.58 ( 0.10 ) 0.58 ( 0.15 )
Norway 0.43 ( 0.16 ) 0.55 ( 0.19 )
Portugal 0.76 ( 0.08 ) 0.69 ( 0.14 )
Spain 0.72 ( 0.07 ) 0.70 ( 0.11 )
Sweden 0.71 ( 0.09 ) 0.60 ( 0.13 )
Switzerland 0.33 ( 0.22 ) 0.35 ( 0.33 )
United Kingdom 0.80 ( 0.07 ) 0.78 ( 0.08 )
United States 0.76 ( 0.04 ) 0.82 ( 0.06 )
Estimates ˆ ½ are small sample bias corrected autocorrelation coeﬃcient from fourth-order
autoregression using industrial production, equation (16). All data is quarterly data, seasonally
adjusted and ﬁltered using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. The full sample is 1980 Q1 to 2001 Q4 for
non-euro-area countries. For countries in EMU, the sample ends in 1998 Q4. Standard errors (s.e.)
are constructed from nonparametric bootstrap with 3000 replications.
15Table 2: The Optimal Hybrid-Targeting Regime: The Closed Economy Case
Full Sample 1990s
Country p-value testing p-value testing
ˆ ´¤ ˜ ´ ˜ ´ = ´¤ ˆ ´¤ ˜ ´ ˜ ´ = ´¤
Australia 0.29 0.81 0.01 0.50 0.69 0.33
Austria 0.15 0.68 0.07 0.25 0.46 0.26
Canada 0.18 0.94 0.00 0.18 0.88 0.00
Chile 0.36 0.72 0.22 0.31 0.64 0.31
Denmark 0.39 0.67 0.17 1.00 0.24 0.14
Finland 0.14 0.91 0.00 0.26 0.84 0.03
France 0.31 0.80 0.08 0.32 0.80 0.08
Germany 0.21 0.83 0.00 0.32 0.67 0.15
Ireland 0.39 0.81 0.09 0.49 0.63 0.37
Israel 0.39 0.90 0.03 1.00 0.79 0.26
Italy 0.21 0.94 0.00 0.29 1.00 0.05
Japan 0.14 0.75 0.00 0.23 0.70 0.01
Korea 0.35 0.90 0.02 0.34 0.56 0.19
Mexico 0.28 0.86 0.01 0.23 0.83 0.05
Netherlands 0.28 0.88 0.06 0.24 0.60 0.17
New Zealand 0.36 0.93 0.03 0.36 0.54 0.25
Norway 0.64 0.77 0.39 0.38 0.56 0.32
Portugal 0.16 0.88 0.00 0.23 0.83 0.04
Spain 0.19 0.80 0.00 0.22 0.92 0.01
Sweden 0.21 0.84 0.00 0.33 0.53 0.21
Switzerland 1.00 0.89 0.44 0.89 0.87 0.36
United Kingdom 0.12 0.76 0.00 0.14 0.44 0.01
United States 0.16 1.00 0.00 0.11 0.91 0.00
Estimates of ˆ ´¤ are constructed using the ˆ ½ in Table 1. Estimates of ˜ ´ are the coeﬃcient on the lag
of prices from equation (17). Data sources are all described in the appendix. The p-values for the
tests are constructed using a nonparameteric bootstrap with 3000 replications.
163.2 Open Economy
To take account of the fact that countries like Israel, Belgium and Ireland are small
and open, we introduce external factors into our analysis. Following Svensson (1998),
we introduce import prices into the Phillips Curve (6):




t + ²t; (18)
where pF
t is the foreign price level denominated in domestic currency. With this
modiﬁcation, all of the results in Section 2 go through, and we can rewrite empirical
speciﬁcation equations (9), (10) as





t + e1t (19)
pt = ´pt¡1 + b1yt¡1 + b2yt¡2 + b3yt¡3 + b4yt¡4 + Ápp
F
t + e2t; (20)
Table 3 reports estimates of output persistence, ½, after accounting for these external
factors. The results are very similar to those in Table 1. The correlation between
these 2 sets of estimates is 0.96 for full sample and 0.89 for 1990s, and the mean
absolute diﬀerence between the estimates is 0.03 and 0.075 respectively. Looking at
the estimates of the various measures of ´ in Table 4, our conclusions from the closed-
economy analysis remain. In virtually every case, our estimate of the optimal hybrid
target has ´ well below one, closer to price-path targeting than inﬂation targeting, but
the actual behavior of prices in these countries suggests something close to inﬂation
targeting.
It is interesting to relate all of these results to what King (1999) referred to as
an evaluation horizon for central bankers. He suggested that in practice an inﬂation
targeting central bank will be evaluated on whether it met its target on average over
some number of years. The evaluation horizon is related to the hybrid regime. The
longer the period over which inﬂation is averaged, the closer the regime is to price-
17Table 3: Output Persistence: The Open Economy Case
Full Sample 1990s
Country
ˆ ½ s.e. ˆ ½ s.e.
Australia 0.66 ( 0.09 ) 0.58 ( 0.19 )
Austria 0.84 ( 0.23 ) 0.63 ( 0.50 )
Canada 0.75 ( 0.06 ) 0.73 ( 0.11 )
Chile 0.61 ( 0.07 ) n/a ( n/a )
Denmark 0.61 ( 0.15 ) 0.13 ( 0.31 )
Finland 0.79 ( 0.05 ) 0.78 ( 0.14 )
France n/a ( n/a ) 0.61 ( 0.17 )
Germany 0.73 ( 0.11 ) 0.69 ( 0.20 )
Ireland 0.48 ( 0.14 ) 0.60 ( 0.22 )
Israel 0.56 ( 0.09 ) 0.15 ( 0.17 )
Italy 0.73 ( 0.09 ) 0.63 ( 0.13 )
Japan 0.73 ( 0.04 ) 0.59 ( 0.09 )
Korea 0.67 ( 0.11 ) 0.60 ( 0.12 )
Mexico 0.67 ( 0.11 ) 0.53 ( 0.21 )
Netherlands 0.65 ( 0.17 ) 0.59 ( 0.29 )
New Zealand 0.59 ( 0.10 ) 0.64 ( 0.16 )
Norway 0.46 ( 0.16 ) 0.67 ( 0.21 )
Portugal 0.78 ( 0.08 ) 0.75 ( 0.18 )
Spain 0.73 ( 0.05 ) 0.74 ( 0.09 )
Sweden 0.74 ( 0.10 ) 0.65 ( 0.16 )
Switzerland 0.32 ( 0.24 ) 0.18 ( 0.43 )
United Kingdom 0.81 ( 0.07 ) 0.79 ( 0.04 )
United States 0.78 ( 0.03 ) 0.84 ( 0.04 )
See notes to Table 1 and the Appendix for data sources.
18Table 4: Optimal Hybrid-Targeting Regime: The Open Economy Case
Full Sample 1990s
Country p-value testing p-value testing
ˆ ´¤ ˜ ´ ˜ ´ = ´¤ ˆ ´¤ ˜ ´ ˜ ´ = ´¤
Australia 0.26 0.82 0.01 0.37 0.70 0.20
Austria 0.09 0.52 0.09 0.29 0.38 0.32
Canada 0.17 0.95 0.00 0.19 0.90 0.00
Chile 0.20 0.57 0.17 n/a n/a n/a
Denmark 0.31 0.52 0.20 1.00 0.30 0.37
Finland 0.13 0.89 0.00 0.14 0.83 0.01
France n/a n/a n/a 0.33 0.67 0.17
Germany 0.19 0.72 0.01 0.21 0.75 0.09
Ireland 0.53 0.78 0.27 0.32 0.71 0.20
Israel 0.39 0.90 0.02 1.00 0.80 0.23
Italy 0.19 0.83 0.01 0.25 0.90 0.07
Japan 0.18 0.71 0.00 0.35 0.70 0.06
Korea 0.26 0.86 0.02 0.29 0.48 0.26
Mexico 0.26 0.88 0.01 0.42 0.88 0.20
Netherlands 0.26 0.83 0.10 0.30 0.60 0.27
New Zealand 0.34 0.99 0.01 0.28 0.50 0.19
Norway 0.56 0.77 0.32 0.24 0.62 0.16
Portugal 0.14 0.85 0.00 0.16 0.85 0.04
Spain 0.18 0.78 0.00 0.17 0.90 0.01
Sweden 0.19 0.80 0.00 0.26 0.53 0.16
Switzerland 1.00 0.86 0.48 1.00 0.87 0.34
United Kingdom 0.11 0.76 0.00 0.13 0.44 0.00
United States 0.14 0.91 0.00 0.10 0.63 0.00
See notes for Table 2 and the Appendix for data sources.
19path targeting. Using this intuition, we can construct approximate measures of the
horizon as (1
´). For many countries we ﬁnd that ´¤ is between 0.2 and 0.3, implying
a horizon of between 3 and 4 quarters. To get a number that is usable in practice,
we need to add another 4 to 6 quarters that it takes for policy changes to have an
impact on prices and output. The implication is that the evaluation horizon should
be in the range of 2 to 3 years.
Before continuing, note that we recomputed all of the results for both the closed
and open economy versions of our model substituting core consumer prices for the
headline measures used in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Tables analogous to 2 and 4 are in
the appendix. Overall, we ﬁnd that the change in the price measure makes very little
diﬀerence. Estimates of ˜ ´ from the price equation are highly correlated between the
two sets of matching results. For the full sample, the correlation for the 17 countries
for which we have data is 0.79 for the closed economy model and 0.83 when import
prices are included.
3.3 Loss Comparison
Simply computing the optimal value for ´, the degree of a hybrid regime, is only
the ﬁrst step. What we really want to know is whether adopting the optimal hybrid
makes any diﬀerence to welfare. Given the fact that estimates of ´ are fairly imprecise,
this question is particularly important. To address it, we construct estimates of the
social loss, LS, for diﬀerent targeting regimes and compare them. Computing the
loss requires that we choose a series of parameters. Before turning to the data, it is
useful to look at some simulations. Using the theoretical results, we can estimate the
extent of the welfare gain that comes from going from an inﬂation targeting regime
to an optimal one. That is, we compare LS[´ = 1] with LS[´ = ´¤] for various values
of the parameters of the model. Note that throughout this exercise, we assume that
the preference parameter ¸ is the same for society and the central bank.
20While it would be interesting to look across a wide range of values for the pref-
erence parameter ¸, output persistence ½ and the slope coeﬃcient ®, the condition
(11) places restrictions on the relationship among these. So instead, we look at a
representative example. First, the restriction has a few simple properties: (1) Given
®, the higher ½ the higher the minimum ¸; and (2) Given ½, the higher ® the higher
the minimum ¸. What that means is that the more persistent output and the ﬂatter
the aggregate supply curve – that’s the inverse of ® in equation (6) – the higher the
preference for inﬂation stability has to be for there to be a solution to the central
bank’s problem. To understand how restrictive this is, we have done a few simple cal-
culations. Setting the discount factor ¯ = 0:99, we see that for ® = 0:5 and ½ = 0:7,
¸ must be greater than 0.65. As ® decreases, the range of permissible values grows.
So when ® = 0:3, ¸ can be as low as 0.4 for ½ = 0:7. This creates a potential problem
for the choice of ®. While we would like to work with relatively low values, we choose
® = 0:5. This is the choice made by Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland (1999), who use
estimates in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) as justiﬁcation.
Using these parameter values, we examine the improvement in the social loss for
each country for two changes: (1) Moving from strict inﬂation targeting to the optimal
hybrid regimes, that is LS[´¤]=LS[´ = 1]; and (2) Shifting form a strict price-path
targeting regime to the optimal hybrid, LS[´¤]=LS[´ = 0]. Throughout we assume
that the preference parameter ¸ = 0:8 and the discount rate ¯ = 0:99. The results
are somewhat sensitive to the choice of ¸, but not to the choice of ¯. Looking at
Table 5, we see that there is an important pattern. In no case does a move from
price-path targeting to the optimal hybrid bring a sizable welfare gain. The same
is not true of a move from inﬂation targeting. That is, the ﬁrst and third columns
include numbers that are far below one – e.g., 0.82 for Canada and 0.87 for Germany
– while the second and fourth columns contain none.
It is worth examining this result in more detail. Figure 2 plots the two ratios
LS[´¤]=LS[´ = 0] and LS[´¤]=LS[´ = 1] for a range of values for ½ and ¸, assuming
21Table 5: Loss Comparison
Full Sample 1990s
Country LS(´¤) LS(´¤) LS(´¤) LS(´¤)
=LS(´ = 1) =LS(´ = 0) =LS(´ = 1) =LS(´ = 0)
Australia 0.94 0.99 0.97 0.99
Austria 0.71* 0.71* 0.95 1.00
Canada 0.82 1.00 0.86 1.00
Chile 0.91 0.99 0.71* 0.71*
Denmark 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.96
Finland 0.71* 0.71* 0.72 1.00
France 0.96 0.99 0.96 0.99
Germany 0.87 1.00 0.91 0.99
Ireland 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.99
Israel 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.96
Italy 0.87 1.00 0.94 0.99
Japan 0.85 1.00 0.97 0.99
Korea 0.93 0.99 0.95 0.99
Mexico 0.93 0.99 0.98 0.99
Netherlands 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.99
New Zealand 0.96 0.99 0.95 0.99
Norway 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.99
Portugal 0.71 1.00 0.80 1.00
Spain 0.86 1.00 0.84 1.00
Sweden 0.86 1.00 0.94 0.99
Switzerland 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.98
United Kingdom 0.71* 0.71* 0.71* 0.71*
United States 0.71* 0.71* 0.71* 0.71*
Notes: Computations use ® = 0:5 and ¸ = 0:8, as well as the estimated value of ½
reported in Table 1. Stars (*) indicate values of (®;¸;½) for which the restriction
(11) is not met, and so the loss cannot be computed. The reported value is the
minimum for which it can be computed.
22Figure 2: Loss comparing Targeting Regimes with Optimal Targeting
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23® = 0:5 and ¯ = 0:99. Taken together, these give us a striking picture of the potential
beneﬁts from adopting various regimes. First, note from Figure 2.A that even if ½
is very small, and so the optimal regime is close to one of pure inﬂation targeting,
the loss from adopting price-path targeting is small. Only when ¸ is set to 2/3rds, a
relatively low value, and when output has virtually no persistence does a move from
price-path targeting to the optimal hybrid imply a welfare gain of as much as 10
percent.
This is in stark contrast with Figure 2.B, where we see the consequences of shifting
from a pure inﬂation targeting regime to the optimal hybrid. As output persistence
rises above 0.6, the ratio of the losses starts to decrease very quickly. (Note that the
lines end at the point where the restriction (11) is no longer met.) That is, the gain
from moving from inﬂation targeting to the optimal hybrid can be very large. To use
Svensson’s terminology, there is a “free lunch” and it can be big. And since we are
unsure how big ½ really is, it is likely prudent to move to price-path targeting.
4 Conclusion
We have examined whether a country is well-advised to target inﬂation, target the
price path, or doing something in between. The issue turns on the persistence of
output deviations from their trend. With high persistence, which is what we tend
to observe, our theoretical results suggest that countries are best oﬀ if they adopt a
hybrid target that is close to price-path targeting. But such a policy regime would be
diﬃcult to adopt for two reasons. First, there is the technical one. The exact targeting
procedure depends on the estimation of both the output trend and output persistence,
both of which are going to be measured with substantial error. And second, the
success or failure of any monetary policy regime rests critically on the ability of
central bankers to communicate what they are doing to the public. Explaining a
24hybrid target would be challenging for even the best central bankers.
Taking these problems into account, we examine the welfare loss from adopting
pure inﬂation or price-path targeting rather than the optimal hybrid. Our conclusion
is that price-path targeting is less risky, in that the maximum social loss from being
wrong – choosing price-path targeting when something else is better – is much smaller
than if one chooses inﬂation targeting.
25Appendix
A.1 Data Description
All data are quarterly beginning in 1980 Q1. For EMU countries, data are through
1998 Q4. For non-EMU countries, data are through 2001 Q4.
1. Prices: Consumer Price Index from the IMF International Financial Statistics.
2. Output: Industrial Production from the IMF International Financial Statis-
tics, except for Portugal and Ireland, which are entirely from the OECD; New
Zealand is from the OECD for 2000 Q3 on; Italy is from OECD for 2001 Q1
on; and Chile is manufacturing production only.
3. Core Consumer Prices: From the OECD
4. Import Prices: The import price index from the IMF International Financial
Statistics, except for Spain, New Zealand, Netherlands, Canada, France, Ire-
land, Israel, Italy where the Unit Value of Imports from IFS is used; Mexico
Import Price Index from Haver Analytics; Austria uses the German CPI; and
Portugal is an equally weighted average of the CPIs for the UK, Spain, France
and Germany.
5. Inﬂation targets are computed from the ”Inﬂation Targeting Country Fact
Sheets” by Frank Gaenssmantel of the Institute of International Economics,
courtesy of Edwin Truman. The target p¤
t is computed as follows
p
¤
t = pt¡1 + ¼
¤ (A.1)
pt = log(CPIt) ¡ p
¤
t when there is p
¤
t (A.2)
pt = log(CPIt) ¡ HPtrendt otherwise (A.3)
26Table A.1: Annual Inﬂation Target
Country Period Inﬂation Target
Australia 1993 Q1 - 2001 Q4 2:5%
Austria 1993 Q1 - 2001 Q4 2:0%
Canada 1992 Q1 - 1994 Q4 4:0%
1995 Q1 - 2001 Q4 3:0%
Chile 1991 Q1 - 1991 Q4 18:0%
1992 Q1 - 1992 Q4 17:5%
1993 Q1 - 1993 Q4 11:0%
1994 Q1 - 1994 Q4 10:0%
1995 Q1 - 1995 Q4 8:0%
1996 Q1 - 1996 Q4 7:0%
1997 Q1 - 1997 Q4 6:0%
1998 Q1 - 1998 Q4 5:0%
1999 Q1 - 1999 Q4 4:3%
2000 Q1 - 2000 Q4 3:5%
2001 Q1 - 2001 Q4 3:0%
Finland 1993 Q1 - 2001 Q4 2:0%
Israel 1992 Q1 - 1992 Q4 14:5%
1993 Q1 - 1993 Q4 10:0%
1994 Q1 - 1994 Q4 8:0%
1995 Q1 - 1995 Q4 9:5%
1996 Q1 - 1996 Q4 9:0%
1997 Q1 - 1997 Q4 8:5%
1998 Q1 - 1999 Q4 4:0%
2000 Q1 - 2000 Q4 3:5%
2001 Q1 - 2001 Q4 3:0%
Korea 1999 Q1 - 1999 Q4 3:75%
2000 Q1 - 2000 Q4 2:5%
2001 Q1 - 2001 Q4 3:0%
Mexico 1995 Q1 - 1995 Q4 19:0%
1996 Q1 - 1996 Q4 20:5%
1997 Q1 - 1997 Q4 15:0%
1998 Q1 - 1998 Q4 12:0%
1999 Q1 - 1999 Q4 13:0%
2000 Q1 - 2000 Q4 10:0%
2001 Q1 - 2001 Q4 6:5%
New Zealand 1992 Q1 - 1996 Q4 1:0%
1997 Q1 - 2001 Q4 1:5%
Norway 2001 Q1 - 2001 Q4 2:5%
U.K. 1992 Q1 - 2001 Q4 2:5%
Source: Frank Gaenssmantel, “Inﬂation Targeting Country Fact Sheets,” mimeo., Institute of
International Economics, 2002.
27where ¼¤ is the annual inﬂation target in the following table, divided by four.
When the target is a range,the midpoint is used.
A.2 The Commitment Case
Our solutions in the text assume that the central bank operates under discretion.
Discretion means that policymakers reoptimize the loss function every period after
observing the state variable yt¡1 and the shock ²t. The alternative to this is commit-
ment, in which the central bank optimizes once and commits to an instrument rule
once and for all.
To ﬁnd the commitment solution we take the derivative of the central bank’s loss
(5) with respect to pt and pe
t, subject to the constraint imposed by the Phillips curve
(6). The resulting policy rule, the equivalent to equation (8), is
pt = ´pt¡1 + ˜ c²t (A.4)
where
˜ c = ¡
˜ D
1 + ® ˜ D
and ˜ D =
®(1 ¡ ¸)
¸(1 ¡ ½2¯)
This is exactly the same as the case under discretion considered in Section 2.1, except
that b = 0. That is, under commitment the optimal response is to react only to the
past price level and the shock, not to yt¡1. And recall that the condition for a solution
to exist under discretion, shown in (11), arises in computing b, and so is not present
here.
















28The ´ that minimizes this loss is trivially 1, which implies inﬂation targeting. Under
commitment, it is optimal to simply give the central bank society’s loss function.
A.3 When Society Prefers Price-Path Targeting
What if society’s preferences are in terms of the path of the price level rather than
an inﬂation target? In this case, the central bank’s problem is the same as the one
in Section 2.1. It is the social loss, (12), that changes. Assuming society cares about




p + (1 ¡ ¸)¾
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y : (A.6)


















Equation (A.7) is the equivalent to text equation (13). The optimal ´ that minimizes
this loss is 0. So, if society cares about the price-path, then the central bank should
be told to care about it, too.
A.4 Substituting Core for Headline Consumer Prices
The following tables are from substituting measures of the core CPI for the headline
CPI in the computations of Section 3. Table A.2 is the analog to text Table 2 and
Table A.3 is the analog to text Table 4. Note that since the output equations (16)
and (19) do not include the price level, the estimates of ½ and ´¤ are unchanged, and
so the corresponding columns in the tables are identical. Comparing these results to
those in the text, we conclude that sustituting core for headline prices changes little.
29Table A.2: Optimal Hybrid-Targeting Regime: Closed Economy with Core CPI
Full Sample 1990s
Country p-value testing p-value testing
ˆ ´¤ ˜ ´ ˜ ´ = ´¤ ˆ ´¤ ˜ ´ ˜ ´ = ´¤
Australia n/a n/a n/a 0.50 0.70 0.32
Austria 0.15 0.44 0.14 0.25 0.27 0.41
Canada 0.18 0.93 0.00 0.18 0.87 0.00
Chile n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Denmark 0.39 0.56 0.25 1.00 0.21 0.12
Finland 0.14 0.91 0.00 0.26 0.73 0.05
France 0.31 0.92 0.06 0.32 0.92 0.06
Germany 0.21 0.90 0.00 0.32 0.81 0.11
Ireland 0.39 0.81 0.08 0.49 0.67 0.33
Israel n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Italy 0.21 0.94 0.00 0.29 1.03 0.04
Japan 0.14 0.39 0.00 0.23 0.47 0.04
Korea n/a n/a n/a 0.34 0.63 0.16
Mexico 0.28 0.91 0.01 0.23 0.84 0.05
Netherlands 0.28 0.79 0.07 0.24 0.52 0.20
New Zealand 0.36 0.81 0.03 0.36 0.54 0.26
Norway n/a n/a n/a 0.38 0.63 0.28
Portugal n/a n/a n/a 0.23 0.79 0.04
Spain 0.19 0.79 0.00 0.22 0.83 0.01
Sweden 0.21 0.78 0.00 0.33 0.46 0.27
Switzerland 1.00 1.02 0.39 1.00 0.93 0.34
United Kingdom 0.12 0.70 0.00 0.14 0.35 0.02
United States 0.16 0.97 0.00 0.11 0.68 0.00
See notes to text Table 2 and Appendix A.1.
30Table A.3: Optimal Hybrid-Targeting Regime: Open Economy with Core CPI
Full Sample 1990s
Country p-value testing p-value testing
ˆ ´¤ ˜ ´ ˜ ´ = ´¤ ˆ ´¤ ˜ ´ ˜ ´ = ´¤
Australia n/a n/a n/a 0.37 0.72 0.21
Austria 0.09 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.17 0.45
Canada 0.17 0.94 0.00 0.19 0.88 0.00
Chile n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Denmark 0.31 0.44 0.29 1.00 0.05 0.35
Finland 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.14 0.70 0.01
France n/a n/a n/a 0.33 0.93 0.08
Germany 0.19 0.87 0.00 0.21 0.86 0.07
Ireland 0.53 0.79 0.24 0.32 0.58 0.25
Israel n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Italy 0.19 0.83 0.01 0.25 0.93 0.02
Japan 0.18 0.37 0.01 0.35 0.45 0.26
Korea n/a n/a n/a 0.29 0.62 0.15
Mexico 0.26 0.95 0.01 0.42 0.89 0.20
Netherland 0.26 0.79 0.09 0.30 0.42 0.37
New Zealand 0.34 0.82 0.02 0.28 0.51 0.19
Norway n/a n/a n/a 0.24 0.69 0.14
Portugal n/a n/a n/a 0.16 0.75 0.05
Spain 0.18 0.79 0.00 0.17 0.77 0.00
Sweden 0.19 0.76 0.00 0.26 0.46 0.21
Switzerland 1.00 1.02 0.41 1.00 0.94 0.33
United Kingdom 0.11 0.71 0.00 0.13 0.34 0.01
United States 0.14 0.94 0.00 0.10 0.69 0.00
See notes to text Table 4 and Appendix A.1.
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